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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores some theoretical and practical issues in developing policy for the management of 
shared  fisheries  for  maximum  value.    Maximisation  of  value  from  the  use  of  resources  is  a  key 
component of sustainability, and transferable rights in commercial fisheries management have contributed 
significantly  toward  this  goal.    Maximising  value  becomes  more  difficult  in  fisheries  shared  among 
commercial, amateur, and indigenous customary users, where rights of access and values gained from 
fishing  differ  in  kind  between  these  groups.  Management  of  stock  abundance  and  catch  allocation 
between sectors both affect the total value achievable from a fishery.  The components of value in these 
attributes for each sector and the basis for optimisation discussed.  However, the practical aspects of 
optimisation across sectors pose some difficulties.  Two approaches to the problem are discussed: the 
information approach and the market approach.  It seems both face considerable challenges.  Information 
is expensive to collect and methods that will provide reasonable accuracy seem difficult to identify in the 
New  Zealand  context.    Market  approaches  appear  promising  but  face  problems  of  political  and 
stakeholder  acceptance.    Conclusions  on  a  practical  way  forward  include  the  need  for  transparent, 
collaborative multi-stakeholder approaches among sector representatives and government agencies.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Maximisation  of  value  from  the  use  of  resources  is  a  key  component  of  the  general  notion  of 
sustainability.  If resources are not used efficiently there will either be less available for current use, or 
resources will become depleted and unavailable to future generations.  Therefore maximising value from 
the sustainable use of fisheries resources and the aquatic environment should be a key goal for fisheries 
management.  
 
Systems of transferable quota rights in commercial fisheries have made a considerable contribution to this 
goal through promoting the flow of resources to their highest valued use in that sector.  The economic 
success of the fishing industry in New Zealand over the last two decades, for example, provides clear 
evidence of the value enabled by quota systems.  However, beyond some rationalisation of fleet capacity 
and optimisation of individual fishing operations in the pursuit of greater value from a limited quantity of 
catch,  there  still  lies  a  challenge  to  maximise  commercial  economic  yield  through  higher  levels  of 
coordination among stakeholders. 
 
Maximisation of total value from fisheries becomes more difficult still when non-commercial users and 
their values are taken into the accounting framework.  In many jurisdictions the decisions that affect the 
distribution  of  value  across  the  fisheries  sectors  are  made  by  governments,  either  by  departmental 
officials  or  by  Ministers  in  Government.    Often,  little  in  the  way  of  quantified  value  information  is 
available to inform these decisions, particularly on non-commercial values.  Financial information on the 
commercial fishing industry tends to be expressed in gross revenues, with little assessment of costs and 
net surplus value to the economy.  IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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But lack of information is only part of the problem.  Where net values are high, such as where quota 
management has been introduced, lack of policy and process change to deal with value distribution can 
lead  to  significant  dispute  over  appropriate  management  settings.    Where  such  dispute  and  possibly 
litigation becomes normalised, the whole management system can suffer from reduced credibility. 
 
This paper sets out the general challenge of the pursuit of increased value in fisheries management, both 
in commercial only, and in fisheries shared with amateur and indigenous fishers.  Two key factors in 
value management – fish stock size and tonnage allocations – are identified and their impacts discussed.  
Then two approaches to the inter-sector optimisation problem are introduced – the information approach 
and the market approach.  The requirements of these are briefly discussed.  The concluding section of the 
paper explores the potential for an approach that draws on both the information and market models that 
may  assist  to  reduce  both  costs  and  conflict  over  outcomes.    Examples  from  the  New  Zealand 
management system are used throughout the paper.   
MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES FOR VALUE 
The foundations of the bio-economic analysis of fisheries assume that exploitation has commercial goals 
– that is, maximum of economic yield (MEY – defined as revenue minus costs to the industry) is the goal.  
Scott Gordon (1954) showed that, in the static analysis, MEY will be found at some biomass above that 
which produces the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for a given fish stock.  This is at the point where 
the slope of the sustainable yield curve is the same as that of the cost curve (figure 1).   
 
 
Figure 1: How value from a fish stock varies with biomass. 
 
The specific biomass at which this occurs in relation to the biomass at which MSY is achieved (BMSY), 
depends on the costs of effort relative to the price of fish.  If costs are relatively low and prices high then 
BMEY will be closer to BMSY than for a fishery where costs are high relative to prices. It is also well to 
remember that BMSY itself is generally less than 50% of the unexploited biomass, and can be less than 
20% for some species according to some model estimates. 
B0        BMEY      BMSY         BOA      BSUB     Biomass (decreasing) IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
  3 
 
The most important general result of Gordon’s analysis of course was to show that unconstrained entry to 
a fishery will continue until total costs equal total revenues (net value zero).  At this point many fisheries 
will be at biomass levels below BMSY and in some cases stocks may collapse while fishing effort is still 
increasing. This analysis encapsulates the key justifications for management intervention in fisheries – 
biological threat and economic waste.   
 
Later dynamic analysis indicated that it could be rational for a sole owner of a fish stock to deplete the 
stock below BMSY, and possibly further to commercial extinction, where the growth rate of the biomass is 
lower than the discount rate (Clark 1973).  However, if the management objectives for a stock include 
both maximising sustainable economic yield and ensuring biological sustainability for the stock, then 
BMSY must serve as the prima facie bottom line for stock biomass.   
 
In the New Zealand commercial fishery, intervention has introduced individual transferable quota, which 
firstly defines those with and without rights to participate.  Secondly, the right is quantified as a share of 
the available total allowable commercial catch (TACC: In New Zealand the TACC is a subset of the total 
allowable catch or TAC that, in addition, provides allowances for non-commercial catches and other 
forms of fishing related mortality).  This cap on commercial extractions and accountability for individual 
limits on catch provides the ability to protect the resource from over-exploitation and generates some 
rents.  The transferability of quota between firms allows the use of the resource to move to those who 
value it most highly – that is, the most efficient producers.  This enables costs to be reduced and further 
rents in the fishery to be realised. 
 
Managing for MEY is, however, not likely to be straightforward.  The level of BMEY depends in part on 
the cost structure of the industry, and this is itself dynamic.  Few fisheries are truly single species target 
fisheries, and therefore catching costs attributed to particular species for different operators will vary with 
catch mixes, fishing strategies, and scale of operations.  So, reaching consensus on the actual biomass to 
serve as the BMEY stock management target, and therefore as the basis for setting TACs, is bound to be 
difficult.   
 
The  alternative  would  be  to  set  TACs  to  achieve  BMSY  (environmental  bottom  line)  and  let  the 
stakeholders sort out a means of maximising value if they can.  The achievement of BMEY by this route 
requires excellent fisher/quota owner coordination, the zenith of which would be sole ownership (i.e. all 
quota shares in a fish stock held by one individual or company).  As a minimum, some sort of quota 
owner cooperation is required, with a commitment to rationalisation of harvesting and maximisation of 
returns from the stock overall.  Such organisations would then be able to use cost scenarios they have the 
ability to actually implement, to model MEY and optimise their harvest strategy to maximise profits, 
effectively shelving (not fishing) the balance of the quota.   
 
In New Zealand some 30 commercial stakeholder organisations have formed to represent quota owners in 
particular stocks.  However, coordination adequate to the challenge of managing for MEY at a biomass 
higher than BMSY is by no means universally in evidence.  Most fishers and firms, it seems, are too fond of 
their independence to want to sign up to a true corporate model of fishery ownership.  There may be 
concern that potential for further rationalisation of catching capacity by such an entity would dispense 
with  the  current  active  role  of  many  fishers,  reducing  them  to  passive  shareholders  in  a  fishing 
corporation.   
 
Some movement towards coordination at the sole ownership end of the spectrum is apparent in New 
Zealand deepwater fisheries with small numbers of quota owners and high capital costs (orange roughy), 
where coordination is less costly and potential savings to individual firms are substantial (Clement 2000).  
It is likely that sustained high fuel prices will promote such rationalisation in more fisheries through their IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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CSOs.  But under ITQs without such coordinating entities and conditions providing strong incentives to 
cooperate, fishers tend to optimise their operations privately – by balancing their catching rights and 
fishing capacity as closely as possible.  This generally means that all rights on offer are fished, and that 
fisheries run close to the TAC, which is set with the objective of bringing the stock to BMSY.   
Stock Management in Shared Fisheries 
In shared fisheries – where commercial, amateur, and customary fishers are all utilising the same stock – 
things can get more complicated.  Although rights to take fish may differ among the sectors, the value 
gained by non-commercial fishers is generally also affected by stock size. Just as commercial fishers have 
differing cost structures and market opportunities, amateur and customary fishers have differing needs 
and values than do commercial fishers.  Some are unrelated to stock size but, in general, larger stock sizes 
tend to favour the values held by non-commercial fishers.  
 
Larger stock size firstly implies that fish will be more abundant.  This may not hold at a local level: just 
because there are more fish in a biological stock spread across a large region doesn’t mean that there will 
necessarily be more fish (or any) in a particular location.  However, it will hold on average over the stock 
area and is likely to be significant to catch rates and total catches across the fishery.  In general, more fish 
in the water should increase catch rates. 
 
Second, an increase in stock size implies the average age and size of fish will increase, and the average 
size of fish caught is also likely to increase.  When stocks are fished down, the age structure of the 
populations change.  A useful way to think about this is that the longer a fish survives, the more times it is 
exposed to the risk of being caught.  To the extent that surviving fish remain part of the target population, 
older (larger) fish will tend to be eliminated over time.  This is important to the growth response of the 
stock biomass.  As the average age of the population is reduced, the biomass growth rate is increased – 
young fish grow faster than old fish. 
 
In some fisheries, non-commercial fishers may have the highest value for fish that are less than the 
maximum size available.  But in general, non-commercial fishers’ value for fish caught increases more 
than arithmetically with fish size.  That is, one big one is generally more valued than two smaller fish 
adding up to the same total weight. 
 
Similarly, most non-commercial fishers value abundance through being able to catch a fish more easily, 
and through being able to catch more fish in their available fishing time, and this value may well also 
increase more rapidly than apparent abundance. 
 
It is now apparent that there can be a fundamental conflict in managing shared fisheries for value.  Given 
a typical BMSY level of 30% of un-fished biomass, the commercial preference for maximum sustainable 
yield is in conflict with a non-commercial preference for higher abundance and larger fish size.  This 
conflict will be reduced somewhat in fisheries were there is very high non-commercial demand, because 
that sector is then required to make a trade-off between the level of sustainable catch and abundance.  The 
conflict  then  becomes  more  of  a  direct  one  over  allocations  from  the  TAC  to  each  sector.    How  to 
determine the optimal stock size remains an interesting and non-trivial question, which interacts with the 
allocation problem. 
Sector Allocations in Shared Fisheries 
A second key variable in optimising value across sectors in shared fisheries is allocation of the available 
catch.  In New Zealand we have ITQ in the commercial sector, quantitatively uncapped catch rights for IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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Maori customary fishers, and regulatory controls – mainly daily bag limits – in the amateur sector.  The 
arrangement for the amateur sector is founded in historical open access, modified by the notion that some 
limit on daily individual catches is desirable to firstly, differentiate amateur fishing from illegal fishing 
for profit, and secondly, constrain total amateur fishing effort where stocks are under pressure.   
 
Decisions on allocations (as well as TACs and bag limits) are made by the Minister of Fisheries and can 
be contentious.  The approach applied to allocation is to estimate how much the non-commercial sector is 
likely to catch under the prevailing conditions of stock condition and daily bag limits, and allocate the rest 
of the TAC to the commercial sector (an allowance for other fishing related mortality is also made – 
mostly to cover estimated unreported catch).  This is not a directive policy so much as a product of 
statutory construction based on historical conditions.   
 
Underlying  the  judgements  about  the  balance  between  catch  constraints  and  sector  allocations  is  the 
principle adopted for allocation of commercial quota on the introduction of stocks to the QMS – catch 
history.  This asserts that those that have invested in fishing and established a catch history should get an 
allocation that reflects that commitment, at least in terms of relative share of the catch if not as a tonnage.  
This principle has worked in the commercial sector where initial allocations can be changed through 
trading so that an efficient distribution is achieved within the sector.  However, it does not work to 
maximise value with allocations between sectors because no adjustments can be made except by the 
Minister’s decision.   
 
It should be noted that just because tensions that may exist between historical fairness and current value 
cannot be eased by trading across sectors after allocations are made, is not to say that value is not taken 
into account in the allocation decision.  The key reason that elected representatives, such as the Minister 
of Fisheries, are charged with such potentially controversial decisions is because they are accountable for 
considering  and  balancing  the  values  of  the  electorate.    Recent  court  findings  have  confirmed  the 
obligation of the Minister to consider a range of values that together add up to well-being.  However, the 
greater the values held by stakeholders the more pressure is brought to bear on the decision-maker.  With 
the efficiencies in ITQ systems producing high quota values, and high cultural values for non-commercial 
fishing, a new approach may be warranted. 
MOVING FORWARD ON MANAGING FOR VALUE 
The challenge of the inter-sector optimisation problem is to equalise the marginal values for change to 
both  stock  size  and  allocations  simultaneously.    Under  the  current  decision-making  system  in  New 
Zealand, an incremental approach to the problem would be to quantitatively assess and/or model the 
values at stake to inform decisions on TACs and allocation between sectors.  An alternative approach 
would be to create a common currency representing the values at stake for the sectors and allow a market 
to develop, so that exchange can be negotiated between the parties holding the values.  Each of these 
approaches has its challenges in both policy acceptance and implementation. 
Information Approach 
The  first  of  the  above  alternatives  –  the  information  approach  –  could,  as  a  sole  strategy,  be  very 
expensive.    Even  without  the  stock  size-abundance  issue,  the  allocation  problem  is  very  information 
demanding.  Schedules of marginal net economic benefit (MNEB) would need to be estimated for each 
sector.    For  the  commercial  sector  net  economic  benefit  comprises  producer  surplus  plus  consumer 
surplus. The MNEB we are interested in is the amount that this benefit changes as a result of a change in 
fish characteristics and availability to each sector, through changes to allocation and/or stock size.  As IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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these characteristics change the MNEB also changes.  This is why we need a schedule and not just a 
single value for MNEB. 
 
For commercial fisheries under ITQ, quota value (if known) could be used to infer producer surplus, with 
appropriate testing of the assumptions that this would involve.  Further data collection through the supply 
chain would be necessary for this, and data on sales volumes and prices would be used to construct the 
MNEB schedule.  To estimate amateur NEB, surveys of fishers would be required to establish willingness 
to pay (WTP) for changes in allocation and stock size. 
 
A recent investigation of theory and existing methods for such valuation studies estimated that a study to 
produce results robust to legal test for six stocks (species area combinations) in New Zealand could take 
five years to complete at a cost of two to three million dollars (Bell et al. 2007).  This study included a 
review of research work carried out in Australia that has investigated and developed methodologies over 
the past decade or so (see McLeod and Nichols 2004; Lindner et al. 2006).  Despite the significant 
amount  of  investment  to  investigate  this  approach,  it  has  yet  to  be  implemented  in  the  practical 
management of fisheries. 
 
The Bell et al. study also noted key issues with estimating WTP for the amateur sector including the lack 
of any prices (e.g. fees for amateur marine fishing licences), and limited scientific knowledge of stock 
status and catches.  In New Zealand a cost recovery scheme is applied to commercial fisheries to pay for a 
significant proportion of the costs of stock research.  Driven by this system, the high value of the large 
volume deepwater fisheries means they attract much of the research budget and capacity.  Inshore shared 
fisheries do not generally attract research interest unless they are of high commercial value, which means, 
for many, relatively little is known. 
 
Catch reporting is required of all commercial fishing, and is a critical feature of the quota management 
system.  Catches from Maori customary fishing, which is carried out under its own set of regulations and 
licensing, is also required to be reported, although this is taking some time to establish as a reliable track 
of catch in the sector.  However, estimates of amateur catches must be made from various types of survey.  
Despite  considerable  expenditure  over  fifteen  years,  definitive  estimates  of  amateur  catch  are  not 
available for most stocks.  Methods combining aerial and boat ramp surveys have recently produced good 
results for one or two of the most popular stocks (Hartill et al. 2006), but for most others very little is 
really known.  Fundamental issues such as the participation rate of the general population in amateur 
fishing still remain unresolved.   
 
These  are  basic  challenges  for  the  information  approach.    The  estimation  of  MNEB  curves  for  the 
amateur sector will require the participation rate and total catch to be estimated with a reasonable degree 
of confidence first.  Tackled together, with a long-term systematic programme and sufficient funding 
there is reason to believe this is achievable.  For New Zealand, budget expenditure in the region of $2.5 to 
$3 million per annum over a decade could allow catch and value research to develop to provide sufficient 
information to manage the key shared fisheries for value.  This is only 10-15% of total current fisheries 
research  expenditure,  but  would  represent  a  significant  new  commitment  to  information  on  non-
commercial fishing, which, under current arrangements, would need to be funded by Government. 
 
However,  having  the  information  required  does  not  solve  the  problem  on  its  own.    The  view  that 
Government could just impose a new allocation on participation in a fishery at will is both economically 
and politically problematic.  The value maximisation objective would only be undermined by a policy that 
reallocated investment goods such as ITQ without redress at market value.  There is little point in aiming 
to maximise value through allocation of resources to their highest valued use if the right to continue to 
benefit from utilisation of the resource is not secure.   
 IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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This  potential  impact  on  the  value  of  quota  will  drive  resistance  to  (or  support  for)  any  attempt  to 
implement  the  results  of  valuation  exercises.    Non-market  valuation  methodology  is  not  universally 
understood or accepted as producing indisputable results, regardless of the rigour with which it might be 
applied.  Those with significant economic interests at stake can be expected to attempt to undermine 
unfavourable  results  by  attacking  the  credibility  of  research  and  analysis,  as  well  as  applying  their 
standard messages in lobbying decision makers. 
 
This leads us to a need to consider the possibility of redress for adjustments to both catch allocations and 
to the value distribution affected by stock size management.  One obvious way to tackle transfers from a 
commercial sector under quota to amateur fishing would be for the government, or the amateur sector 
itself, to buy quota in the market.  If the government proposed to purchase quota for the “fishing public,” 
this raises the question of whether that is the most equitable and politically sustainable solution.   
Market Approach 
A  direct  negotiation  or  market  approach  to  value  management  is  based  on  the  reasoning  that  it  is 
effectively impossible for a governance body to comprehend the values held by a multiplicity of users, 
even generalised as just commercial and non-commercial fishers.  The consideration of such an approach 
is  also  more  or  less  obligatory  in  the  face  of  the  problems  with  adjustments  under  the  information 
approach.  A more cost effective approach to optimality would be to allow the holders of those values to 
compare them in a market – or at least in discussion.  This works well in the commercial ITQ fisheries in 
New Zealand, so why not extend the rights system to amateur users? 
 
As usual, things are not quite so simple in application as we might hope.  Many of the same problems that 
make the gathering of information on amateur catch and value difficult and expensive might come into 
play here as well.  The open access nature of the amateur fishery means that there are an uncertain and 
variable number of participants pursuing a range of different values.  Some of these users will hold 
significant  marginal  values  for  the  factors  that  can  be  affected  by  management  settings  (TACs  and 
allocations), but others will not.  For example, those fishing in pursuit of food for the family table will be 
affected differently from those fishing more for sport or trophy fish.  
 
Just as the values for abundance and fish size affected by stock size management can be distinguished in 
kind from those associated with the total amount of fish taken, so can these other values.  It is at least 
possible that not all non-commercial values for fishing can be denominated in kilograms of fish caught.  
Thus if a market were established to trade values between the sectors using quota as a currency, this will 
only ever deal with part of the problem.  However, simplicity does reduce transactions costs and it is 
doubtful whether a currency for the value trade-off in stock size management (for example) could be 
developed.  So a market system would likely be limited to allocation of the TAC, and this option is 
generally simplified as an extension of an existing commercial quota system to cover non-commercial 
fishing. 
 
An immediate issue is raised for a market system based on individual holdings by amateur fishers – 
transactions costs.  Earlier we saw that even in commercial fisheries where all participants are known and 
have their interests in the fishery quantified in quota shares, gaining agreement on specific arrangements 
to try to maximise value overall can be difficult.  This coordination problem takes on a new meaning in 
the non-commercial sphere where interests are much more dispersed.   
 
For example, if non-commercial values are spread across one million participants who hold an average 
net value of $200 per year for fishery access, this would place the economic value of the sector on the 
same page as the commercial industry in New Zealand.  From national surveys of amateur fishers, the 
evidence is that somewhere in the vicinity of 70% of fish is caught by 30% of fishers.  So a majority of IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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amateur fishers will have a lower than average net value for fishing.  Once we get down below say $100 
per person per annum, it would not take much in the way of transactions costs placed on the individual to 
erode this value, although cumulatively these values are large.  This means that individual quota systems 
for amateurs, for example, could be value destroying rather than value enhancing, if care is not taken in 
the way they are designed.   
 
As an alternative, a group approach to transferable quantified rights could invest the non-commercial 
catching  rights  to  stocks  in  entities  that  could  be  either  representative  organisations  or  commercial 
companies. Basic allocations could be received annually by such entities that would have responsibility 
for ensuring that these were not exceeded.  Groups holding rights could, for example, manage access, 
require reporting or run surveys to estimate catch, and raise funding from users to pay for these services.  
Such organisations could be authorised to negotiate or trade with commercial stakeholder organisations, 
increasing or reducing their holdings in response to demand from non-commercial fishers.   
 
The constitutional nature of organisations holding amateur rights is a question that would require some 
attention.  Sutinen and Johnson (2003) propose angling management organisations with functions along 
the lines described above, structured as listed companies.  Normal commercial incentives would drive 
these organisations to maximise shareholder value, but this would depend upon continuing to receive an 
annual allocation of rights from the government.  Thus the government would retain the power to ensure 
compliance of the organisations with a framework of rules, which would need to take into account issues 
of monopoly control over rights, including pricing. 
 
Another  alternative  is  to  endow  amateur  fisher  representative  organisations  with  the  catching  rights.  
Questions of who is being represented and the constitutional structure of the organisation would need to 
be explored.  However, as long as the organisation does not have the right to exclude anyone who wishes 
to join, and standard democratic processes prevail, this should provide a reasonable basis to proceed.  
This type of arrangement may well leave a residual representative role for government.  In the long tail of 
the distribution of value held for amateur participation in fishing, there are a large number of people with 
a very low individual interest.  Together, these values can be substantial, but the individuals do not have 
sufficient motivation to act to defend those values if they are threatened.  Thus governments may need to 
continue to represent some fraction of the public interest in fishing. 
 
From a pragmatic point of view in the New Zealand context, this scenario can seem a little far-fetched.  
Any practical market scheme must be based on a closed set of rights for the amateur sector.  Even in 
commercial fisheries where the economic benefits of enclosure of the commons have been evident for 
many years in examples such as the New Zealand QMS, there has not been a rapid take up around the 
world.  Conversion from open access is resisted more often than not.  However, licensing schemes have 
been successfully introduced recently for marine recreational fishing in Australia, and most US coastal 
states have licensing. 
 
In New Zealand, amateur fishers have fought hard against any form of licensing for marine fishing and so 
far have succeeded.  The suggestion to include the amateur sector in the QMS has been around for almost 
as long as the system itself (Pearse 1991).  However, even the most ardent and effective members of the 
resistance recognise that there are real issues of scarcity that must be dealt with, and that change is 
inevitable  and  could  even  be  beneficial.    On  the  other  hand,  they  have  a  strong  political  hand  with 
something like 25% of the general population claimed as amateur fishers.  They are unlikely to agree to 
significant change unless it can be demonstrated that the new arrangements will safeguard the value that 
they currently obtain from the fishery, into the future.  However, the costs of information gathering under 
current institutional arrangements suggests that some change will be required before these values can 
even be assessed. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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ENABLING VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENT 
The problems of allocation of value between commercial and non-commercial sectors are clearly linked 
to broader issues of governance for fisheries.  A model that is focused primarily on information and the 
modelling  of  optimality  assumes  an  ability  to  impose  such  a  solution  on  stakeholders.    Where  the 
outcomes can have significant impacts on the value of assets such as ITQ, such solutions can be expected 
to put to every test available to the affected parties unless they have been involved in the development of, 
and support, the prescription.   
 
Similar processes in stock assessment for setting catch limits to protect stocks result in regular challenge 
and review of decisions in New Zealand.  This can undermine the integrity of the information gathering 
process, and drive up the costs of providing information and decision advice, in an attempt to ensure they 
are robust enough to survive challenge.  Programmes to provide value information for stock management 
and allocation decisions based on this model without accompanying process change would be expensive 
and may be of questionable value in terms of overall welfare improvement.   
 
Even  if  both  stock  assessment  and  value  information  were  robust  against  all  challenge,  using  that 
information to maximise value across the sectors implies significant change to basic rights of access to the 
fishery for amateur fishers.  It is likely that, at least for some fisheries, tighter constraints on total take by 
amateurs will be required.  In others, commercial allocations might be reduced to rebuild abundance to 
increase value to amateurs.  However, to prevent this value being dissipated by a matching increase in 
amateur catch, further rules will be required.   
 
The  conclusion  is  soon  reached  that,  if  change  to  access  rights  is  required  to  implement  value 
management once we have the required information, those changes should logically be developed as early 
as possible.  First, changes in access rights are likely to significantly affect the values held for fishing, and 
second, the required changes would be likely to lower the costs of information gathering considerably.  
For example, if the changes required some amateur fishers to register or be licensed, this would assist 
with estimating participation rates, and could provide a database for sampling of catches.  
 
In addition, the issue already raised in respect of uncompensated changes to the distribution of rights such 
as  ITQ  would  need  to  be  addressed  under  the  information  approach,  in  order  not  to  undermine  the 
efficiency  objective  that  is  behind  management  for  value.    After  the  long  and  expensive  road  of 
information gathering and institutional change required for this approach to work, we arrive at the need 
for a market transaction to exchange rights between the sectors. 
 
A market approach, as discussed above, would also require changes to existing amateur rights in New 
Zealand,  and,  potentially,  significant  changes  in  the  degree  of  organisation  in  the  amateur  sector.  
However, the model would tend to drive such organisational change once in place.  Potential revenue 
from  licensing  or  other  means  of  allocating  the  available  catch  within  the  sector  could  make 
representative  organisations  financially  viable,  where  at  present  they  struggle  to  survive.    The 
commercially driven shareholders company model could achieve the same ends, and has some advantages 
in terms of accountability and in being able to use existing company law. It is likely that these companies 
holding and managing amateur fishing rights would become the new representative bodies for amateur 
fishing interests in any case. 
 
Such schemes for trading catch rights would, as already mentioned, nominally only cover the value to be 
gained from allocation of a fixed TAC between the sectors.  Other potential value, such as might be 
gained from managing a stock at a level greater than BMSY, could be dealt with through a negotiation 
process.  Well resourced representative or commercial operators of the amateur franchise could undertake 
valuation  studies  on  other  attributes  of  the  fishing  experience  in  order  to  inform  their  business.    By IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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enhancing the fishing experience they would be able to increase their customer base, charging rates, and 
income.  If they identified a potential increase in value for say a higher abundance, an agreement could be 
negotiated with industry organisations for a change in management target in exchange for payment or a 
concession in another stock. 
 
A possible third way forward would be to distinguish interests in the amateur sector on the basis of the 
70-30 rule mentioned earlier (30% of fishers catching 70% of fish).  Under this scheme, the sector would 
be split into high and low users on the basis of a bag limit.  For example, in a fishery where the current 
daily bag limit is 10, this would be lowered to say 3 and access would remain unrestricted for those 
satisfied by that limit.  Those fishers who wish to be able to catch more fish than the new low limit would 
be required to belong to an organisation similar to the model discussed for under the market approach. 
 
Under this model, the majority of amateurs who enjoy access but are not taking large amounts of fish 
would not be affected by the change.  The more serious sports and food gathering fishers have a higher 
level  of  personal  interest  and  will  be  more  willing  to  pay  for  access  and  motivated  to  contribute  to 
management organisations.  However, this model would potentially increase the necessary charges for 
access rights for the high use fishers, and generate less complete information on amateur demand, activity 
and catch. 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
To make such changes to basic access rights as moving from an open access amateur right to licensing 
with  hard  catch  limits,  either  strong  executive  powers  of  Government  or  a  broad  consensus  on  this 
direction would be required.  Neither of these pertains in New Zealand at present.  Under the mixed 
member  proportional  electoral  system  that  was  introduced  for  parliamentary  elections  in  1993,  New 
Zealand  has  since  been  governed  by  minority  led  coalitions  that  often  need  to  negotiate  support  for 
legislation with opposition parties. Achieving policy and legislative change is now much more dependent 
on consensus among legislators, and hence among a range of stakeholders, than it was in the past.  
 
In fisheries, where the commercial and amateur sectors are both of significant importance economically, 
both sides need to be supportive of any significant change.  It is unlikely that such agreement will be 
forthcoming from the current circumstances.  Such bold moves will require consensus at the level of 
national leadership among the fishing sectors, the Government and its agencies.  Until these parties begin 
a positive process of collaborative discussion it is likely that major improvements in management of 
shared fisheries for value will remain difficult to achieve.   
 
 
In order to change the current environment toward a more collaborative mode, the government may need 
to move into a new role.  For the past decade or more, stakeholder groups have only rarely worked 
together on management problems.  This has yielded some small successes, particularly in the scallop and 
rock-lobster fisheries.  However, at a national level dealing with fundamental institutional change, little 
collaboration has been attempted.  Obviously the management agency is a key stakeholder at this level, as 
is the Minister.  Leadership from the government side in bringing all parties to the same table in a long-
term process to work toward institutional change is likely to pay dividends.   
 
Concentrating effort and resources on cultivating a new governance culture of thoughtful collaboration, 
mutual respect and eventually of trust, is possibly the most efficient route available to move toward 
maximising value from the use of fisheries resources.  Without considerable work on shared ownership of 
the  problem,  commitment  to  common  goals,  and  respect  for  the  values  of  others,  it  is  unlikely  that 
stakeholders in our shared fisheries will come to feel safe enough to agree to significant institutional 
change in the foreseeable future. IIFET 2008 Vietnam Proceedings 
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